PRABHU SINGH: HALL OF SHAME:MOST CORRUPTED UPA GOVERNMENT

AWARD FOR MOST CORRUPTED GOVERNMENT IS,

THE NOMINEES ARE............................CONGRESS, DMK, NCP AND UPA

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NOMINEE CONGRESS IS

THE MOST POWERFULL MINISTERS OF UPA IS MAUNMOHAN SINGH,P.CHIDAMPARAM AND KAPIL SIBAL

BEST IN COMMONWEALTH SCAM:

The cap of Indian scandal list is Commonwealth Games loot. Yes, literally a loot! Even before the long awaited sporting bonanza could see the day of light, the grand event was soaked in the allegations of corruption. It is estimated that out of Rs. 70000 crore spent on the Games, only half the said amount was spent on Indian sportspersons. The Central Vigilance Commission, involved in probing the alleged corruption in various Commonwealth Games-related projects, has found discrepancies in tenders � like payment to non-existent parties, will-ful delays in execution of contracts, over-inflated price and bungling in purchase of equipment through tendering � and misappropriation of funds.

SURESH KALMADI

CASES ARE STILL IN INVESTIGATION,BUT NEXT COMMONWEALTH GAMES ARE ANNOUNCED.

A STRONG SUPPORT BEHIND HIM........POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM DELHI!

BOFORS SCAM:

PANCHAT RAJ HERO INVOLVED IN THIS SCAM.CONGRESS HAD A GREAT CAPTAIN IN THIS SCAM.I WILL SHOW YOU A WAY TO MAKE A SCAM.

The Bofors scandal is known as the hallmark of Indian corruption. The Bofors scam was a major corruption scandal in India in the 1980s; when the then PM Rajiv Gandhi and several others including a powerful NRI family named the Hindujas, were accused of receiving kickbacks from Bofors AB for winning a bid to supply India�s 155 mm field howitzer. The Swedish State Radio had broadcast a startling report about an undercover operation carried out by Bofors, Sweden�s biggest arms manufacturer, whereby $16 million were allegedly paid to members of PM Rajiv Gandhi�s Congress. Most of all, the Bofors scam had a strong emotional appeal because it was a scam related to the defense services and India�s security interests.

AAM ADMI KE SATH PAISE KITHNA KUWA?

COAL GATE SCAM:

UNDER THE MINISTRY OF MANMOHAN SINGH,IS HE GUIDED IT..............................!

Coal allocation scam or Coalgate, as referred by the media, is a political scandal concerning the Indian government's allocation of the nation's coal deposits to public sector entities (PSEs) and private companies by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In a draft report issued in March 2012, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) office accused the Government of India of allocating coal blocks in an inefficient manner during the period 2004–2009. Over the Summer of 2012, the opposition BJP lodged a complaint resulting in a Central Bureau of Investigation probe into whether the allocation of the coal blocks was in fact influenced by corruption.

1972–2010. Background to Coalgate: history of coal allocations In India [edit]

Firms eligible for coal allocation [edit]

Historically, the economy of India could be characterized as broadly socialist, with the government directing large sectors of the economy through a series of five-year plans. In keeping with this centralised approach, between 1972 and 1976, India nationalised its coal mining industry, with the state-owned companies Coal India Limited (CIL) and Singareni Collieries Company (SCCL) being responsible for coal production.

This process culminated in the enactment of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976, which terminated coal mining leases with private lease holders. Even as it did so, however, Parliament recognised that the nationalised coal companies were unable to fully meet demand, and provided for exceptions, allowing certain companies to hold coal leases:

1976. Captive mines owned by iron and steel companies.
1993. Captive mines owned by power generation companies.
1996. Captive ^[14]

The coal allocation process [edit]

“In July 1992 Ministry of Coal, issued the instructions for constitution of a Screening Committee for screening proposals received for captive mining by private power generation companies.” The Committee was composed of government officials from the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Railways, and the relevant state government.^[14] “A number of coal blocks, which were not in the production plan of CIL and … SSCL, were identified in consultation with CIL/SSCL and a list of 143 coal blocks were prepared and placed on the website of the MoC for information of public at large.”^[15] Companies could apply for an allocation from among these blocks. If they were successful, they would receive the geological report that had been prepared by the government, and the only payment required from the allocatee was to reimburse the government for their expenses in preparing the geological report.^[16]

Coal allocation guidelines [edit]

The guidelines for the Screening Committee suggest that preference be given to the power and steel sectors (and to large projects within those sectors). They further suggest that in the case of competing applicants for a captive block, a further 10 guidelines may be taken into consideration:

status (stage) level of progress and state of preparedness of the projects;
net worth of the applicant company (or in the case of a new SP/JV, the net worth of their principals);
production capacity as proposed in the application;
maximum recoverable reserve as proposed in the application;
date of commissioning of captive mine as proposed in the application;
date of completion of detailed exploration (in respect of unexplored blocks only) as proposed in the application;
technical experience (in terms of existing capacities in coal/lignite mining and specified end-use);
recommendation of the administrative ministry concerned;
recommendation of the state government concerned (i.e., where the captive block is located);
track record and financial strength of the company.^[17]

Results of the coal allocation program [edit]

The response to the allocation process between 2004 and 2009 was spectacular, with some 44 billion metric tons of coal being allocated to public and private firms.^[18] By way of comparison, the entire world only produces 7.8 billion tons annually, with India being responsible for 585 million tons of this amount.^[19] Under the program, then, captive firms were allocated vast amounts of coal, equating to hundreds of years of supply, for a nominal fee.

Year of allocation	Government Companies		Private Companies		Power Projects		Total
	No. of blocks	GR (in MT)	No. of blocks	GR (in MT)	No. of blocks	GR (in MT)	No. of blocks	GR (in MT)
Up to 2005	29	6,294.72	41	3,336.88	0	0	70	9,631.6
2006	32	12,363.15	15	3,793.14	6	1,635.24	53	17,791.53
2007	34	8,779.08	17	2,111.14	1	972	52	11,862.22
2008	3	509.99	20	2,939.53	1	100	24	3,549.52
2009	1	337	12	5,216.53	3	1,339.02	16	6,892.55
2010	0	0	0	0	1	800	1	800
Total	99	28,283.94	105	17,397.22	12	4,846.26	216	50,527.42

Out of the above 216 blocks, 24 blocks were de-allocated (three blocks in 2003, two blocks in 2006, one block in 2008, one block in 2009, three blocks in 2010, and 14 blocks in 2011) for non-performance of production by the allocatees, and two de-allocated blocks were subsequently reallocated (2003 and 2005) to others. Hence, 194 coal blocks, with aggregates geological reserves of 44.44 billion metric tons, stood allocated as at 31 March 2011.

Source: Draft CAG Report, Table 5.1.^[20]

Given the inherent subjectivity in some of the allocation guidelines, as well as the potential conflicts between guidelines (how does one choose between a small capacity/late stage project and a large capacity/early stage project?) it is unsurprising that in reviewing the allocation process from 1993 to 2005 the CAG says that "there was no clearly spelt out criteria for the allocation of coal mines."^[14] In 2005 the Expert Committee on Coal Sector Reforms provided recommendations on improving the allocation process, and in 2010 the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act (MMDR Act), 1957 Amendment Bill was enacted, providing for coal blocks to be sold through a system of competitive bidding.^[21]^[22]

The foregoing supports the following conclusions:

The allocation process prior to 2010 allowed some firms to obtain valuable coal blocks at a nominal expense
The eligible firms took up this option and obtained control of vast amounts of coal in the period 2005–09
The criteria employed for awarding coal allocations were opaque and in some respects subjective.

March 2012. Coalgate explodes: the Draft CAG Report [edit]

Overview

The CAG report, leaked to the press in March as a draft and tabled in Parliament in August, is a performance audit focusing on the allocation of coal blocks and the performance of Coal India in the 2005–09 period. The Draft Report, stretching to over 100 pages—far more detailed and containing more explosive allegations than the toned-down Final Report of some 50 pages—was the document that sparked the Coalgate furor. The Draft Report covers the following topics:

Overview (pp. 1–2)
Audit Framework (pp. 3–4)
Institutional Framework (p. 5–10)
Gaps in Supply and Demand (p. 11–17)
Coal Blocks-Allocation and Production Performance (p. 18–55)
Production Performance of CIL (p. 56–83)
Conclusion and Recommendations (pp. 84–88)
Annexures (pp. 89–110)

As far as Coalgate is concerned, the key passages of the Draft Report are in Chapter 5, where the CAG charges that:

In 2005 the Government had the legal authority to allocate coal blocks by auction rather than the Screening Committee, but chose not to do so.^[23]
As a result of its failure to auction the coal blocks, public and private companies obtained "windfall gains" of 1067303 crore(s)(US$200 billion), with private companies obtaining 4795 billion(s) (US$88 billion) (45%) and government companies obtaining 5078.03 billion(s) (US$93 billion) (55%).